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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. Sec. 78-2-
2(3)0). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Is the timely filing by a person claiming benefits under Utah Code Ann. § 38-1- et. 
seq., of a notice of claim for a mechanics lien under Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7, barred 
when said person has previously filed a notice of claim for a mechanics lien under 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7 for the same work but did not file any action to enforce the 
previously filed notice of claim within the time limits set by Utah Code Ann. §38-1-11. 
Standard of Review: Matter of Law reviewed for correctness. MacFarlane v. State Tax 
Comm'n, 2006 UT 25, If 9, 134 P.3d 1116,, State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 
1994). 
Preservation for Appeal: This issue was properly preserved for appeal having been ruled 
upon by the Trial Court. (Record 00197) 
Standard of Review: Matter of Law reviewed for correctness. MacFarlane v. State Tax 
Comm'n, 2006 UT 25, ff 9, 134 P.3d 1116,, State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 
1994) 
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2. Are procedures under Utah Code Annotated §38-9-1 et. seq. ( Wrongful Lien Statue) 
applicable for expedited disposition of a lien claim filed pursuant UCA § 38-1- 1 et seq. 
(Mechanic's Lien Statue). 
Preservation for Appeal: This issue was properly preserved for appeal having been ruled 
upon by the Trial Court. (Record 00197 ) 
Standard of Review: Matter of Law reviewed for correctness. MacFarlane v. State Tax 
Comm'n, 2006 UT 25, fflj 9, 134 P.3d 1116,, State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 
1994). 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUES 
Utah Code Ann. sec. 38-1-3. Those entitled to lien — What may be attached. 
"Contractors, subcontractors, and all persons performing any services or furnishing 
or renting any materials or equipment used in the construction, alteration, or 
improvement of any building or structure or improvement to any premises in any 
manner and licensed architects and engineers and artisans who have furnished 
designs, plats, plans, maps, specifications, drawings, estimates of cost, surveys or 
superintendence, or who have rendered other like professional service, or 
bestowed labor, shall have a lien upon the property upon or concerning which they 
have rendered service, performed labor, or furnished or rented materials or 
equipment for the value of the service rendered, labor performed, or materials or 
equipment furnished or rented by each respectively, whether at the instance of the 
owner or of any other person acting by his authority as agent, contractor, or 
otherwise except as the lien is barred under Section 38-11-107 of the Residence 
Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act. This lien shall attach only to such 
interest as the owner may have in the property. " 
Utah Code Ann sec. 38-1-7(2005). Notice of claim — Contents - Recording -- Service on 
owner of property. 
"(1) (a) (i) Except as modified in Section 38-1-27, a person claiming benefits under this 
chapter shall file for record with the county recorder of the county in which the property, or 
some part of the property, is situated, a written notice to hold and claim a lien within 90 
days after the date of final completion of the original contract under which the claimant 
claims a lien under this chapter. 
(ii) For purposes of this Subsection (1), final completion of the original contract, 
and for purposes of Section 38-1-33, final completion of the project, means: 
(A) if as a result of work performed under the original contract a permanent 
certificate of occupancy is required for the work, the date of issuance of a 
permanent certificate of occupancy by the local government entity having 
jurisdiction over the construction project; 
(B) if no certificate of occupancy is required by the local government entity having 
jurisdiction over the construction project, but as a result of the work performed 
under the original contract an inspection is required as per state-adopted building 
codes for the work, the date of the final inspection for the work by the local 
government entity having jurisdiction over the construction project; or 
(C) if with regard to work performed under the original contract no certificate of 
occupancy and no final inspection are required as per state-adopted building codes 
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by the local government entity having jurisdiction over the construction project, the 
date on which there remains no substantial work to be completed to finish the work 
on the original contract. 
(b) Notwithstanding Section 38-1-2, where a subcontractor performs substantial 
work after the applicable dates established by Subsections (l)(a)(ii)(A) and (B), 
that subcontractor's subcontract shall be considered an original contract for the sole 
purpose of determining: 
(i) the subcontractor's time frame to file a notice of intent to hold and claim a lien 
under this Subsection (1); and 
(ii) the original contractor's time frame to file a notice of intent to hold and claim a 
lien under this Subsection (1) for that subcontractor's work. 
(c) For purposes of this chapter, the term "substantial work" does not include: 
(i) repair work; or 
(ii) warranty work. 
(d) Notwithstanding Subsection (l)(a)(ii), final completion of the original contract 
does not occur if work remains to be completed for which the owner is holding 
payment to ensure completion of that work. 
(2) (a) The notice required by Subsection (1) shall contain a statement setting forth: 
(i) the name of the reputed owner if known or, if not known, the name of the record 
owner; 
(ii) the name of the person: 
(A) by whom the lien claimant was employed; or 
(B) to whom the lien claimant furnished the equipment or material; 
(iii) the time when: 
(A) the first and last labor or service was performed; or 
(B) the first and last equipment or material was furnished; 
(iv) a description of the property, sufficient for identification; 
(v) the name, current address, and current phone number of the lien claimant; 
(vi) the amount of the lien claim; 
(vii) the signature of the lien claimant or the lien claimant's authorized agent; 
(viii) an acknowledgment or certificate as required under Title 57, Chapter 3, 
Recording of Documents; and 
(ix) if the lien is on an owner-occupied residence, as defined in Section 38-11-102, 
a statement describing what steps an owner, as defined in Section 38-11-102, may 
take to require a lien claimant to remove the lien in accordance with Section 38-11-
107. 
(b) Substantial compliance with the requirements of this chapter is sufficient to hold 
and claim a lien. 
(3) (a) Within 30 days after filing the notice of lien, the lien claimant shall deliver or 
mail by certified mail a copy of the notice of lien to: 
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(i) the reputed owner of the real property; or 
(ii) the record owner of the real property. 
(b) If the record owner's current address is not readily available to the lien claimant, 
the copy of the claim may be mailed to the last-known address of the record 
owner, using the names and addresses appearing on the last completed real 
property assessment rolls of the county where the affected property is located. 
(c) Failure to deliver or mail the notice of lien to the reputed owner or record owner 
precludes the lien claimant from an award of costs and attorneys' fees against the 
reputed owner or record owner in an action to enforce the lien. 
(4) The Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing shall make rules 
governing the form of the statement required under Subsection (2)(a)(ix). " 
Utah Code Ann, (2007) 38-1-11. Enforcement - Time for — Lis pendens — Action for debt 
not affected — Instructions and form affidavit and motion. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Owner" is as defined in Section 38-11-102. 
(b) "Residence" is as defined in Section 38-11-102. 
(2) A lien claimant shall file an action to enforce the lien filed under this chapter 
within 180 days from the day on which the lien claimant filed a notice of claim under 
Section 38-1-7. 
(3) (a) Within the time period provided for filing in Subsection (2) the lien claimant 
shall file for record with the county recorder of each county in which the lien is 
recorded a notice of the pendency of the action, in the manner provided in actions 
affecting the title or right to possession of real property, or the lien shall be void, 
except as to persons who have been made parties to the action and persons having 
actual knowledge of the commencement of the action. 
(b) The burden of proof is upon the lien claimant and those claiming under the lien 
claimant to show actual knowledge under Subsection (3)(a). 
(4) (a) A lien filed under this chapter is automatically and immediately void if an 
action to enforce the lien is not filed within the time required by this section. 
(b) Notwithstanding Section 78-12-40, a court has no subject matter jurisdiction to 
adjudicate a lien that becomes void under Subsection (4)(a). 
(5) This section may not be interpreted to impair or affect the right of any person to 
whom a debt may be due for any work done or materials furnished to maintain a 
personal action to recover the debt. 
(6) (a) If a lien claimant files an action to enforce a lien filed under this chapter 
involving a residence, the lien claimant shall include with the service of the complaint 
on the owner of the residence: 
(i) instructions to the owner of the residence relating to the owner's rights under 
Title 38, Chapter 11, Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act; and 
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(ii) a form to enable the owner of the residence to specify the grounds upon which 
the owner may exercise available rights under Title 38, Chapter 11, Residence Lien 
Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act. 
(b) The instructions and form required by Subsection (6)(a) shall meet the 
requirements established by rule by the Division of Occupational and Professional 
Licensing in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative 
Rulemaking Act. 
(c) If a lien claimant fails to provide to the owner of the residence the instructions 
and form required by Subsection (6)(a), the lien claimant shall be barred from 
maintaining or enforcing the lien upon the residence. 
(d) Judicial determination of the rights and liabilities of the owner of the residence 
under this chapter and Title 38, Chapter 11, Residence Lien Restriction and Lien 
Recovery Fund Act, and Title 14, Chapter 2, Private Contracts, shall be stayed 
until after the owner is given a reasonable period of time to establish compliance 
with Subsections 38-ll-204(4)(a) and (4)(b) through an informal proceeding, as 
set forth in Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, commenced 
within 30 days of the owner being served summons in the foreclosure action, at the 
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing and obtain a certificate of 
compliance or denial of certificate of compliance, as defined in Section 38-11-102. 
(e) An owner applying for a certificate of compliance under Subsection (6)(d) shall 
send by certified mail to all lien claimants: 
(i) a copy of the application for a certificate of compliance; and 
(ii) all materials filed in connection with the application. 
(f) The Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing shall notify all lien 
claimants listed in an owner's application for a certificate of compliance under 
Subsection (6)(d) of the issuance or denial of a certificate of compliance. 
(7) The written notice requirement applies to liens filed on or after July 1, 2004. 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Interest holder" means a person who holds or possesses a present, lawful 
property interest in certain real property, including an owner, title holder, 
mortgagee, trustee, or beneficial owner. 
(2) "Lien claimant" means a person claiming an interest in real property who offers a 
document for recording or filing with any county recorder in the state asserting a 
lien or other claim of interest in certain real property. 
(3) "Owner" means a person who has a vested ownership interest in certain real property. 
(4) "Record interest holder" means a person who holds or possesses a present, 
lawful property interest in certain real property, including an owner, titleholder, 
mortgagee, trustee, or beneficial owner, and whose name and interest in that real 
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property appears in the county recorder's records for the county in which the 
property is located. 
(5) "Record owner" means an owner whose name and ownership interest in certain 
real property is recorded or filed in the county recorder's records for the county in 
which the property is located. 
(6) "Wrongful lien" means any document that purports to create a lien or 
encumbrance on an owner's interest in certain real property and at the time it is 
recorded or filed is not: 
(a) expressly authorized by this chapter or another state or federal statute; 
(b) authorized by or contained in an order or judgment of a court of competent 
jurisdiction in the state; or 
(c) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed by the owner of the real 
property. 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-2. Scope. 
(1) (a) The provisions of Sections 38-9-1,38-9-3,38-9-4, and 38-9-6 apply to any 
recording or filing or any rejected recording or filing of a lien pursuant to this 
chapter on or after May 5, 1997. 
(b) The provisions of Sections 38-9-1 and 38-9-7 apply to all liens of record 
regardless of the date the lien was recorded or filed. 
(2) The provisions of this chapter shall not prevent a person from filing a lis pendens 
in accordance with Section 78-40-2 or seeking any other relief permitted by law. 
(3) This chapter does not apply to a person entitled to a lien under Section 38-1-3 
who files a lien pursuant to Title 38, Chapter 1, Mechanics' Liens. 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-7. Petition to nullify lien — Notice to lien claimant -- Summary 
relief— Finding of wrongful lien -- Wrongful lien is void. 
(1) Any record interest holder of real property against which a wrongful lien as 
defined in Section 38-9-1 
has been recorded may petition the district court in the county in which the 
document was recorded for summary relief to nullify the lien. 
(2) The petition shall state with specificity the claim that the lien is a wrongful lien 
and shall be supported by a sworn affidavit of the record interest holder. 
(3) (a) If the court finds the petition insufficient, it may dismiss the petition without a hearing. 
(b) If the court finds the petition is sufficient, the court shall schedule a hearing 
within ten days to determine whether the document is a wrongful lien. 
(c) The record interest holder shall serve a copy of the petition on the lien claimant 
and a notice of the hearing pursuant to Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 4, Process. 
(d) The lien claimant is entitled to attend and contest the petition. 
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(4) A summary proceeding under this section is only to determine whether or not a 
document is a wrongful lien. The proceeding shall not determine any other property 
or legal rights of the parties nor restrict other legal remedies of any party. 
(5) (a) Following a hearing on the matter, if the court determines that the document 
is a wrongful lien, the court shall issue an order declaring the wrongful lien void ab 
initio, releasing the property from the lien, and awarding costs and reasonable 
attorney's fees to the petitioner. 
(b) (i) The record interest holder may record a certified copy of the order with the 
county recorder. 
(ii) The order shall contain a legal description of the real property. 
(c) If the court determines that the claim of lien is valid, the court shall dismiss the 
petition and may award costs and reasonable attorney's fees to the lien claimant. 
The dismissal order shall contain a legal description of the real property. The 
prevailing lien claimant may record a certified copy of the dismissal order. 
(6) If the district court determines that the lien is a wrongful lien as defined in 
Section 38-9-1, the wrongful lien is void ab initio and provides no notice of claim or 
interest. 
(7) If the petition contains a claim for damages, the damage proceedings may not 
be expedited under this section. 
Utah Code Ann. 38-1-25, Abuse of lien right -- Penalty. 
(1) Any person entitled to record or file a lien under Section 38-1-3 is guilty of a 
class B misdemeanor who intentionally causes a claim of lien against any property 
containing a greater demand than the sum due to be recorded or filed: 
(a) with the intent to cloud the title; 
(b) to exact from the owner or person liable by means of the excessive claim of lien 
more than is due; or 
(c) to procure any unjustified advantage or benefit. 
(2) In addition to any criminal penalties under Subsection (1), a person who violates 
Subsection (1) is liable to the owner of the property or an original contractor or 
subcontractor who is affected by the lien for the greater of: 
(a) twice the amount by which the abusive lien exceeds the amount actually due; or 
(b) the actual damages incurred by the owner of the property. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant (herein after Judston) is a contractor who performed work and 
improvements for certain real property owned by Appellee ( herein after Fothill). 
Judston filed notices of a claim of lien under Utah Code Ann. § 39-1- et seq. Foothill 
brought an action under UCA § 38-9-1 et. seq. ( Wrongful Lien Statue) for an expedited 
hearing to declare Judston's lien claim a wrongful lien and void same. Judston counter-
claimed to enforce the lien claim. The matter came before the Court Trial Court for 
expedited hearing on February 5, 2007. 
The trial court found that the notice of claim of lien filed on July 14, 2006, was 
filed before final completion of the work as defined by UCA§ 38-1-7, and therefore 
timely for purposes of UCA §38-1-7. (Record 0198 and Transcript page 35 line 10). 
An action was filed to foreclose the lien claimed therein within 180 days of the filing of 
same pursuant to UCA § 38-1-11, when Judston filed its answer and Counterclaim on 
October 12, 2006. (Record 0029 and 0026) 
The trial court granted Foothill's Motion for an Expedited Hearing pursuant to 
UCA§38-9-l et. seq.. The trial court held that Judston's lien rights were extinguished 
when Judston did not file an action to foreclose a lien within 180 days of the filing of a 
prior notice of claim of lien. The trial court held that Judston's July 14, 2006 notice of 
claim of lien constituted a wrongful lien. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Judston filed a Notice of Lien on September 24, 2004 in the amount of $ 
120,246.13. (Record 0198 Findings of Facts Conclusions of Law). 
2. On January 11, 2005 Judston filed an amended Notice of Lien in the amount of 
$82,749.67. (Record 0198 Findings of Facts Conclusions of Law). 
3. No action was filed to enforce the lien claim within 180 days of either filing. 
(Record 0198 Findings of Facts Conclusions of Law). 
4. On July 14, 2006 Judston filed aNotice of Lien in the amount of $ 98,017.91. ( 
Third Notice of Lien). (Record 0198 Findings of Facts Conclusions of Law). 
5. On October 4, 2006 Foothill filed a Complaint of Wrongful Lien (Record 009) 
6. On October 12 , 2006, Judston filed an Answer, Counterclaim and Third Party 
Complaint (Record 0029) seeking to enforce lien rights pursuant to the notice of lien 
filed July 14, 2006 and Utah Code 38-1-11. (Record 026) 
7. The July 14, 2006 Notice of Lien filed by Judston was filed prior to final completion 
of the original contract. (Record 0198 and Transcript page 35 line 10). 
8. All notice of Lien filings relate to the same work last performed on or about August 
17,2004. (Record 0198). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The trial court erred when it found as a matter of law that Judston's right to file a lien 
claim had been extinguished and that the notice of lien of July 14, 2007 constituted a 
wrongful lien. 
2. The trial court erred in the application of procedures under Utah Code Annotated 38-
9 et.seq ( WrongfuU Lien) to the present case because UCA § 38-9 et. seq. is by in own 
terms inapplicable to notices of claim of lien filed under UCA§ 38-1 et. seq. Provisions 
of UCA § 38-1 et. seq dealing with the manner and timing of filing of a notice of claim 
of lien do not define who is entitled to file a lien under UCA § 38-1 et. seq. and thus 
defects in the timing or manner of the filing of a notice of claim of lien under UCA § 
38-1 et. seq. do not remove the claimant from the statutory exception of UCA § 38-9-
l(6)(b). Furthermore, UCA § 38-1 et seq. contains its own provisions at UCA §38-1-
25 for treatment of improperly filed notices of claim of lien. 
ARGUMENT 
1. The trial court erred when it found as a matter of law that Judston's right to file a 
lien claim had been extinguished and that the notice of claim of lien of July 14, 2007 
constituted a wrongful lien. 
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Judston's rights to file a notice of claim of lien arose under Utah Code Ann. 
§38-1-3 which provides that contractors " shall have a lien upon the property upon or 
concerning which they have rendered service, performed labor, or furnished or rented 
materials or equipment...". Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7 details the procedure for filing a 
notice of claim and the requirement that such be filed within 90 days of after the date of 
final completion of the original contract. The section goes on to statutorily define 
"final completion". Utah Code Ann § 38-1-11 (b)(2) provides for the time for 
enforcement of such claim by filing " an action to enforce the lien filed under this 
chapter within 180 days from the day on which the lien claimant filed a notice of claim 
under Section 38-1-7." 
Judston filed the first notice of claim of lien on September 24, 2004 and 
subsequently amended same on January 11, 2005 (Record 0198). Judston did not 
pursue enforcement of said notice of lien within 180 days of the original or amended 
filing. On July 14, 2006 Judston filed a lien in regards to the same work performed on 
the same property of Foothill. As of July 14, 2006 final completion of the original 
contract had not occurred with in the meaning of Utah Code 38-1-7 and thus the filing 
of this notice of claim of lien was timely. Judston file an action to enforce said lien on 
October 14, 2006 , within 180 days of having filed the notice of claim of lien. 
Judston complied with the plain meaning of the statue in regards to timely filing 
and enforcement of its July 14, 2006 notice of claim of lien, which was the only notice 
of claim of lien before the Court. Despite this fact the trial court applied its reading of 
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AAA Fencing Company vs. Raintree Development and Energy Company 714 P.2d 
289 and Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11(3)(2006) ( currently re-numbered as paragraph (4) 
(a)&(b)) in determining that Judston had previously lost the right to file any notice of 
claim of lien including, specifically the July 14, 2007 notice of claim of lien, because it 
had previously filed a notice of claim of lien for the same work, which notice of claim 
had become void. (Record 0197 paragraphs 6 & 7). 
The issue before the court in AAA Fencing Company vs. Raintree 
Development and Energy Company 714 P.2d 289 was wether failure to enforce a 
mechanics lien within the statutory period was a procedural limitation which could be 
subject to waiver, or a jurisdictional limitation which if not met deprived the Court of 
jurisdiction to adjudicate the lien claim. The AAA Fencing Company court at page 291 
held that" it is jurisdictional and forecloses their rights." the court further stated at page 
292, 
" The time for enforcing mechanic's liens set out in section 38-1-11, 
supra, limits a lienor's rights to twelve months after his work is 
completed. At that point, both his rights and his remedies under the statue 
are extinguished." 
Foothill argued and the trial court agreed that the holding of AAA Fencing Company 
applied to bar Judston's July 14, 2007 filing of notice to claim a lien because Judston 
had not filed an action to enforce its prior notice of claim of lien. 
AAA Fencing Company is inapplicable to the present case. The lien claim rights 
of the claimant in AAA Fencing Company where bound up in a single notice of claim of 
lien filing and when the claimant failed to file a timely enforcement action the 
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claimant's rights were extinguished because the claimant had no other basis to assert or 
enforce such rights. The AAA Fencing Company Court was not considering and did not 
hold that the expiration of one notice of claim of lien might bar the subsequent filing of 
a otherwise timely notice of claim of lien. In AAA Fencing Company, both the lien 
claimant's time to file a notice of claim of lien and the time for enforcement ran from 
the completion of the original contract, with the time for filing a notice of claim of lien 
expiring before the time for enforcement. Due to substantial changes in UCA§ 38-1-
et. seq. the present case is different. 
In the first instance a lien claimant's time to file an action to enforce a lien now 
runs from the date of filing of a notice of claim rather that from the date of "final 
completion". Specifically, UCA § 38-1-11 (2) provides " A lien claimant shall file an 
action to enforce the lien filed under this chapter within 180 days from the day on 
which the lien claimant filed a notice of claim under Section 38-1-7." In the present 
case Judston's right to file a timely notice of claim extended several years after the date 
work was last performed because "final completion" had not occurred. (Record 0198). 
It is not disputed that Judston's July 14, 2006 filing of a notice of claim was timely in 
that it was filed before "final completion" as required by UCA§ 38-l-7(l)(a)(ii). 
Judston filed an enforcement action within 180 of having filed " a notice of claim", 
specifically the July 14, 2006 notice of claim. 
The holding of AAA Fencing Company and the plain meaning of Utah Code Ann. 
§38-1-11(3)(2006) ( currently re-numbered as paragraph (4) (a)&(b)), do not prohibit 
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the filing of a subsequent notice of claim , where such is timely, and not previously 
adjudicated. The provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11(3)(2006) ( current re-
numbered as paragraph (4) (a)&(b)) simply provide an automated mechanism for 
disposition of notices of claim which have not been enforced within 180 days of filing 
of the notice. Nothing in the plain language of UCA § 38-1 - et. seq. established any 
prohibition or limitation on a claimant's filing of successive or multiple notice of claim 
of lien so long as such are timely filed. 
It is conceivable that a person entitled to file a notice of claim of lien may file 
such a claim, substantial time may pass, and the time to enforce the notice of claim of 
lien may be set to expire rendering the notice of claim automatically void. If that 
claimant knows that their time to file a notice of claim has not and will not run out for at 
lease some future time, the claimant may, due to resumptions of payment, on going 
negotiations or otherwise, chose not to file an action to enforce lien rights pursuant to 
one or more notice of claim. In fact, a claimant may even release a notice of claim, 
rightly relying upon the plain meaning of the statue which would permit re-filing of a 
notice of claim at any time within 90 days of "final completion". 
Ultimately the property owner controls the length of time in which a claimant 
may file a notice of claim of lien. The time for filing is cutoff by "final completion" 
which in most cases consists of the property owner obtaining either a certificate of 
occupancy or passing final inspection. UCA§ 38-l-7(l)(a)(ii). The statutory definition 
of ufinal completion" in terms of a certificate of occupancy or final inspection creates a 
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bright line test based upon readily available public records by which to determine the 
cut off date for filing notices of claim of lien. Thus, any person with an interest in 
property potentially subject to filing of a notice of claim of lien may readily determine 
wether potential claimants have time remaining in which to file a notice of claim of 
lien. 
" The purpose and intent of Utah's Mechanics' Lien Act, Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-
1 to -29 (2001), "'manifestly has been to protect, at all hazards, those who perform the 
labor and furnish the materials which enter into the construction of a building or other 
improvement.'" John Wagner Assocs. v. Hercules, Inc., 797 P.2d 1123, 1125 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990) (quoting Rio Grande Lumber Co. v. Darke, 167 P. 241, 244 (Utah 1917)). 
Lien statutes should be broadly construed "to effectuate that purpose." Interiors 
Contracting v. Navalco, 648 P.2d 1382, 1386 (Utah 1982)." Sill v Hart, 2007 UT 45. In 
light of the purpose and intent of the Mechanic's Lien Act, the requirements thereof 
should be liberally construed in favor of preserving the rights and remedies of lien 
claimants. The Court should not read into the act any requirements or restrictions not 
specifically set forth. Where no provision of the Act prohibits successive filing or re-
filing of a notice of claim of lien, and such is otherwise timely, the claimant is 
permitted to do so. 
In this case Judston was a person entitled to file a notice of claim of lien because 
Judston had provided services to the property. Judston's filing of notice of claim of lien 
filed July 14, 2006 was timely as ufinal completion" had not occurred . No provision of 
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provision of UCA, Title 38, Chapter 1 prohibited Judston from filing the July 14, 2006 
notice of claim of lien. The provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11(3)(2006) ( current 
re-numbered as paragraph (4) (a)&(b)) operate simply to void any prior notice of claim 
of lien which was not enforced, and do not prohibit subsequent filing of an otherwise 
timely notice of claim of lien. Consequentially, Judston's notice of claim of lien of 
July 14, 2007 was not wrongful within the meaning of UCA § 38-9-1 et.seq. 
2. The trial court erred in the application of procedures under Utah Code Annotated 38-
9 et. seq. ( Wrongfull Lien) to the present case because UCA §38-9-1 et. seq. is by in 
own terms inapplicable to notices of claim of lien filed under UCA§ 38-1-1 et. seq. 
The trial court held that" a person who files an untimely mechanics lien is not as a 
matter of law entitled to a lien under 38-1-1 et. seq." (Record 0197 paragraph 3), and " 
An untimely filed mechanics lien may constitute a wrongful lien under Section 38-9-1 
et. seq., and properly be the subject of a motion to nullify a wrongful lien." (Record 
0197 paragraph 4). 
Utah Code Ann § 38-9-2 (3) defines the scope of the wrongful lien statue, UCA§ 
38-9-1 et. seq, and specifically states " This chapter does not apply to a person entitled 
to a lien under Section 38-1-3 who files a lien pursuant to Title 38, Chapter 1, 
Mechanic's Liens." In Sill v Hart 2007 UT 45 the Supreme Court stated, 
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"Under our rules of statutory construction, we look first to the statute's 
plain language to determine its meaning." Sindt v. Ret. Bd, 2007 UT 16, 
1fl[ 8, P.3d (internal quotation marks omitted). We read "[t]he plain 
language of a statute . . . as a whole" and interpret its provisions "in 
harmony with other provisions in the same statute and with other statutes 
under the same and related chapters." State v. Schofield, 2002 UT 132, fflf 
8,63 P.3d 667 (internal quotation marks omitted). We do so because f"[a] 
statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or sections and is animated by 
one general purpose and intent. Consequently, each part or section should 
be construed in connection with every other part or section so as to 
produce a harmonious whole.'" State v. Maestas, 2002 UT 123, fflf 54, 63 
P.3d 621 (quoting Norman J. Singer, 2A Sutherland Statutory 
Construction §§ 96:05 (4th ed. 1984))." 
In reaching the conclusion that an untimely file notice of claim of mechanic's lien may 
constitute a wrongful lien under UCA§ 38-9-1 et. seq. the trial court has failed to give 
meaning to the plain language of UCA§ 38-9-2(3). The trial court has also failed to 
give meaning to UCA § 38-1-3 which defines those entitled to lien, or to UCA § 38-1-
25 which provides for treatment of improperly filed notices of claim of lien under UCA 
§ 38-1-1 et. seq. In holding that a person filing an untimely mechanics lien is not as a 
matter of law entitled to a lien under 38-1-1 et. seq. the trial court has confused the 
procedural and temporal requirements of filing a notice of claim of lien under UCA § 
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38-1-7 and 38-1-11, with the identification of the person entitled to file a lien under 
UCA § 38-1-3. Under the trial court's analysis any defense to the filing or 
enforcement of a notice of claim of lien under UCA§ 38-1-1 et. seq. could result in a 
determination not only invalidating the notice of claim of lien or denying enforcement 
under UCA§ 38-1-1 et seq. but also to a determination of wrongful lien under UCA 
§38-9-1 et. seq. The circular nature of the trial court's reasoning casts a result in which 
a party defending against a mechanics lien claim filed under UCA § 38-1-1 et. seq. 
could assert any defense in an expedited action under UCA§ 38-9-1 et. seq. and if 
successful the court could hold that UCA § 38-9-2(3) does not apply to the claimant, 
because the claimant is not a person entitled to file a lien under Section 38-1-3 . 
The intention of the legislature in enacting the Wrongful Lien state of UCA§ 38-
9-1 et. seq was to provide an expedited procedure for resolution of lien claims base on 
documents recorded or filed not " (a) expressly authorized by this chapter or another state or 
federal statute; (b) authorized by or contained in an order or judgment of a court of competent 
jurisdiction in the state; or (c) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed by the owner 
of the real property." UCA § 38-9-1(6). The Wrongful Lien statue was not intended to 
provide a procedure or forum for expedited or summary disposition of mechanics lien 
claims or other lien claims specifically permitted by separate statue. UCA § 38-1-25 
provides the appropriate remedy for improper claims filed under the mechanics Lien 
Statue of UCA § 38-1-1 et. seq. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Judston respectfully asks this Court to overturn the 
trial court's ruling that Judston's notice of claim of lien filed July 14, 2006 was 
untimely and constituted a wrongful lien . Judston also asks this Court to overturn the 
trial court's ruling finding the wrongful lien procedure of UCA§ 38-9-et. seq., 
applicable to Judston's July 14, 2006 notice of claim of lien. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED: 
Date: September 18,2007 
Dane L Hines, 
Attorney for 
Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF was 
mailed by first class mail this September 19, 2007 to the following: 
Charles W. Hanna, 
223 West Bulldog Blvd, Ste 200 
Provo, Utah 84604 Date: 1/^/d? 
Dane L Hines / 
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ADDENDUM 
Charles W. Hanna (Bar No. 1326) 
223 West Bulldog Ave. Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 375-3650 
Fax:(801)375-3670 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT 
FOOTHILL PARK, L.C. a Utah Limited 
Liability Company, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
JUDSTON, INC., a Utah Corporation, 
Defendant 
JUDSTON, INC., a Utah Corporation, 
Counterclaimant and 
Third Party Plaintiff 
vs. 
NORTHSTAR COMPANIES, INC., a Utah 
Corporation 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
CASE NO. 060102680 
Judge: Pullan 
Third Party Defendant 
A hearing on Plaintiff Foothill Park, L.C.'s Motion to Annul a Wrongful Lien came on 
regularly before the Court on February 5, 2007, the Plaintiff being present and represent by its 
attorney Charles W. Hanna and the Defendant being present and represented by its attorney Dane 
L. Hines and the Court having read the memorandums filed herein heard the argument of counsel 
now hereby makes its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Defendant Judston, Inc., has filed three mechanic's liens against the real property 
owned by Plaintiff Foothill Park, L.C. 
2. On September 24, 2004, Judston Inc. filed a lien against the real property of Foothill 
Park, L.C. in the amount of $120,246.13. 
3. On January 11, 2005, Judston, hie. filed an Amended Lien in the amount of $82,749.67 
4. Judston, Inc. did not file an action to foreclose either its September 2004 lien or its 
January 2005 lien within the 180 days required by Section 38-1-11(1). 
5. On July 14, 2006, Judston Inc. filed a lien in the amount of $98,017.91. 
6. All three liens filed by Defendant Judston Inc., relate to the exact same work which 
was completed on August 17, 2004. 
7. The third lien filed by Judston Inc., was filed before a final inspection of the work of 
Judston Inc., had been performed. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This matter comes before the Court on Petitioner's Motion to Nullify a Wrongful Lien 
filed pursuant to 38-9-7 U.C.A. 
2. The Wrongful Lien Statute by its terms cannot apply to a person entitled to a lien under 
the Mechanic's Lien Statute 31-1-1 et seq., as a lien authorized by Statute is exempted from the 
definition of a wrongful lien by Section 38-9-1(6) (b). 
3. A person who files an untimely mechanics lien is not as a matter of law entitled to a 
lien under 38-1-1 et seq. 
4. An untimely filed mechanics lien may constitute a wrongful lien under Section 38-9-1 
et seq., and properly be the subject of a motion to nullify a wrongful lien. 
5. This court holds that the July 2006 lien filed by Defendant Judston, Inc., constitutes a 
wrongful lien. 
6. The failure of Defendant Judston, Inc., to file an action to foreclose its September 2004 
and January 2005 mechanic's liens within the 180 days provided in Section 38-1-11(1) 
extinguished any lien rights associated with these liens pursuant to the holdings of the Utah 
Supreme Court in AAA Fencing Company vs. Raintree Development and Energy Company 714 
P.2d 289 and Projects Unlimited, Inc., vs. Copper State Thrift & Loan Co. 798 P.2d 738. Once 
these lien rights have been extinguished as a matter of law, this court lost subject matter 
jurisdiction and cannot adjudicate a lien which has become void for this reason. 
7. The holdings of the Utah Supreme Court in AAA Fencing Company vs. Raintree 
Development and Energy Company 714 P.2d 289 and Projects Unlimited, Inc., vs. Copper State 
Thrift & Loan Co. 798 P.2d 738 have been codified in section 38-1-11(3) which became 
effective on May 1, 2006 prior to Defendant Judston Inc., filing its third mechanic's lien in July 
2006. 
8. The subsequent filing of Defendant Judston, Inc., of the July 2006 mechanic's lien 
after its right to file or enforce a mechanic's lien had been extinguished as a matter of law 
constituted the filing of a wrongful lien. 
9. Plaintiff Foothill Park, L.C. is entitled to $1,000.00 statutory damages pursuant to 38-
9-1 U.C.A. and to an award of its attorney's fees and costs. See Affidavit of Attorney Fees and 
Costs filed herewith. 
DATED AND SIGNED this P 6 day of March, 2007. 
BY THE COURT: 
2007 UTSC 20060106 - 060807; Sill v. Hart; 
Joel Sill, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Bill Hart dba Hart Construction, Defendant and Petitioner. 
Nos. 20060106,20060208 
Supreme Court of Utah 
June 8, 2007 
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals, Third District, Silver Summit, The Honorable Deno 
Himonas No. 020500012, 
Attorneys: David B. Thompson, Christina Inge Miller, Park City, David L. Arrington, Salt Lake City, 
for plaintiff Robert J. Dale, P. Bruce Badger, Bradley L. Tilt, Salt Lake City, for defendant 
DURHAM, Chief Justice: 
BACKGROUND 
f 1 This case involves a dispute between a property owner and a contractor in the construction of a 
private residence. Joel Sill, a residential property owner, entered into an agreement with Bill Hart, a 
general contractor, to construct a custom home in Summit County. Construction of the residence began 
in June 1999 and continued until December 2001 when the parties had a falling-out regarding 
completion of the residence. Hart stopped work on Sill's property, leaving the residence unfinished. In 
esponse, Sill filed this suit alleging various claims including breach of contract. Hart counterclaimed 
illeging breach of contract and unjust enrichment and seeking to foreclose a mechanics' lien for work 
or which Hart had yet to be paid. More than two and a half years after the suit was initiated, Sill 
hallenged the enforceability of Hart's mechanics' lien for failing to meet the notice requirements of 
ection 38-1-1 l(4)(a) of the Mechanics' Lien Act.(fnl) The parties stipulated that all issues concerning 
tie enforceability of the lien would be preserved until after the jury reached a verdict at trial. Following 
le trial, the jury awarded Hart $314,500 for his unjust enrichment and mechanics' lien claims and 
lcluded an award for prejudgment interest, attorney fees, and costs. 
f2 When Hart sought to reduce the jury verdict to a judgment, the court considered Sill's challenge 
) the validity of the mechanics' lien. Hart admitted that he did not serve Sill with any of the required 
>rms or instructions informing the owner of his LRFA rights as required by section 38-1-1 l(4)(a) 
1001). He argued, however, that the notice requirements did not apply to this case because (1) Sill, the 
wner, not Hart, the contractor, commenced the action; (2) Sill had no rights under LRFA because Hart 
as not a subcontractor; and (3) Hart, the general contractor, had not been paid in full. Sill argued that 
art's failure to serve him with the notice requirements of section 38-1-1 l(4)(a) created a complete 
risdictional bar to the enforcement of the lien. 
1f3 The trial court concluded that Hart was not required to comply with the notice requirements of 
ction 38-1-1 l(4)(a) because he filed a counterclaim, not a complaint. Accordingly, the court enforced 
5 mechanics' lien. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the notice requirements of section 38-
1 l(4)(a) are triggered whenever an action is filed seeking to enforce a lien on a residence, regardless 
whether the lien claimant files a complaint or a counterclaim. Sill v. Hart, 2005 UT App 537, ^9 , 128 
]d 1215. The court of appeals rejected Sill's assertion that failure of a lien claimant to comply with 
:tion 38-1-1 l(4)(a) is a jurisdictional bar and concluded instead that the failure constitutes an 
irmative defense. Id ^ | 14-15. 
|^4 We granted certiorari to determine whether the requirements of Utah Code section 38-1-1 l(4)(a) 
apply to counterclaims, whether those requirements apply regardless of the remedies available to a 
property owner under LRFA, and whether a failure to comply with section 38-1-1 l(4)(a) creates a 
jurisdictional bar to adjudication of an action to enforce a lien. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah 
Code section 78-2-2(3)(a), (5) (2002). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
%5 "On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of appeals, not the trial court." Fla. Asset Fin. 
Corp. v. Utah Labor Comm% 2006 UT 58, \ 8, 147 P.3d 1189 (internal quotation marks omitted). This 
case presents an issue of statutory interpretation, a question of law that we review7 for correctness. Id. 
ANALYSIS 
\6 Hart argues that the court of appeals' determination that the notice requirements of section 38-1-
1 l(4)(a) extend to counterclaims should be reversed. He also argues that the notice requirements do not 
apply and therefore do not need to be complied with when an owner has no available rights under 
LRFA. Additionally, Hart argues that failure to comply with section 38-1-1 l(4)(a) creates an affirmative 
defense, not a jurisdictional bar. We agree with each of his arguments. 
\l "Under our rules of statutory construction, we look first to the statute's plain language to 
determine its meaning." Sindt v. Ret. Bd, 2007 UT 16, | 8, P.3d (internal quotation marks 
Knitted). We read "[t]he plain language of a statute . . . as a whole" and interpret its provisions "in 
larmony with other provisions in the same statute and with other statutes under the same and related 
chapters." State v. Schofield, 2002 UT 132, \ 8, 63 P.3d 667 (internal quotation marks omitted). We do 
;o because "'[a] statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or sections and is animated by one general 
mrpose and intent. Consequently, each part or section should be construed in connection with every 
>ther part or section so as to produce a harmonious whole.'" State v. Maestas, 2002 UT 123, f 54, 63 
\3d 621 (quoting Norman J. Singer, 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction § 96:05 (4th ed. 1984)). 
| 8 The purpose and intent of Utah's Mechanics' Lien Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-1-1 to -29 (2001), 
'manifestly has been to protect, at all hazards, those who perform the labor and furnish the materials 
/hich enter into the construction of a building or other improvement.'" John Wagner Assocs. v. 
(ercules, Inc., 797 P.2d 1123, 1125 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (quoting Rio Grande Lumber Co. v. Darke, 
67 P. 241, 244 (Utah 1917)). Lien statutes should be broadly construed "to effectuate that purpose." 
iteriors Contracting v. Navalco, 648 P.2d 1382, 1386 (Utah 1982). The broad remedial powers of the 
lechanics' Lien Act, however, have been tempered by enactment of LRFA and the legislature's 
cognition of the competing interest of owners of residential property to keep their credit and title to the 
roperty clear of unwarranted encumbrances. 
f 9 Thus, the Mechanics' Lien Act requires certain acts by lien claimants in order to protect owners of 
sidential property. Section 38-1-11(4) (2001) provides: 
(a) If a lien claimant files an action to enforce a lien filed under this chapter involving a 
residence . . . the lien claimant shall include with the service of the complaint on the owner 
of the residence: 
(i) instructions to the owner of the residence relating to the owner's rights under Title 38, 
Chapter 11, [LRFA]; and 
(ii) a form affidavit and motion for summary judgment to enable the owner of the residence 
to specify the grounds upon which the owner may exercise available rights under Title 38, 
Chapter 11,[LRF A]. 
(e) If a lien claimant fails to provide to the owner of the residence the instructions and form 
affidavit required by Subsection (4)(a), the lien claimant shall be barred from maintaining or 
enforcing the lien upon the residence.(fn2) 
f 10 The first issue we must resolve is whether the notice requirements of section 38-1-1 l(4)(a) apply 
o counterclaims. We conclude that they do not. It has long been established that the purpose of the 
Mechanics' Lien Act is "to provide protection to those who enhance the value of a property by supplying 
abor or materials." AAA Fencing Co. v. Raintree Dev. & Energy Co., 714 P.2d 289, 291 (Utah 1986). 
Ve have also recognized the "modern trend" in mechanics' lien cases "to dispense with arbitrary rules 
vhich have no demonstrable value in a particular fact situation." Projects Unlimited, Inc. v. Copper 
"tate Thrift & Loan Co., 798 P.2d 738, 744 (Utah 1990) (upholding lien against attack where 
leficiencies were technical and did not prejudice the defendant). It is against this backdrop that we 
onsider the notice requirements of section 38-1-1 l(4)(a). 
\ 11 The pertinent language of section 38-1-1 l(4)(a) provides, "If a lien claimant files an action to 
nforce a lien filed under this chapter involving a residence . . . the lien claimant shall include with the 
ervice of the complaint on the owner of the residence . . . " (emphasis added). Looking to the plain 
mguage of the statute, "we assume that each term in the statute was used advisedly; thus the statutory 
/ords are read literally, unless such a reading is unreasonably confused or inoperable." State v. Bluff 
002 UT 66, f 34, 52 P.3d 1210 (internal quotation marks omitted). The plain language of section 38-1-
l(4)(a) supports the trial court's interpretation that the notice requirements are applicable only at the 
litiation of an action through service of a complaint, not a counterclaim. The language is not 
mbiguous. The "fil[ing of] an action" is qualified by the reference to the "service of the complaint on 
le owner of the residence." Thus, a "complaint" refers to a pleading that is filed by a plaintiff at the 
ommencement of a lawsuit requiring service, not on an attorney, but on an individual at his residence, 
he filing of such an "action" does not include liens enforced by counterclaim where the action has 
Iready been commenced and the service of the lien is on the residential property owner's legal counsel. 
h3) 
Tfl2 This narrow reading of "action" is also supported by the overarching purpose of the Mechanics' 
ien Act and the narrow protection LRFA is intended to provide. As noted previously, the purpose of 
le Mechanics' Lien Act is to protect original contractors, subcontractors, and others who enhance the 
alue of real property through improvements. LRFA also protects residential property owners against 
le substantial costs associated with litigation arising from an unwarranted mechanics' lien. Utah Code 
nn. § 38-11-107 (2001). Thus, the need for LRFA protection exists when actions are commenced by a 
sn claimant, before litigation costs have been incurred by the property owner. Such actions are 
>mmenced when a complaint is filed and served on a property owner. See Utah R. Civ. P. 3(a) ("A civil 
:tion is commenced by (1) filing a complaint... or (2) by service of a summons together with a copy 
^the complaint...."). The notice requirements of section 38-1-1 l(4)(a) simply do not apply to liens 
>ught to be enforced through counterclaims because any benefit that could be derived from LRFA 
•otections has been relinquished by the property owner who has already initiated legal proceedings. In 
is case, because Sill had already hired an attorney, initiated legal action, and incurred costs, the 
otections provided by LRFA would not, and were not intended to, benefit him. Moreover, service of 
e counterclaim was required by the Rules of Civil Procedure to be on Sill's counsel, not the "owner of 
e residence." Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-1 l(4)(a). Any benefit that Sill could have derived from the notice 
requirements was clearly moot at that juncture. Instructions informing him how to defeat the lien 
without significant litigation costs were irrelevant because he had already hired an attorney and engaged 
in litigation by initiating this action against the contractor. 
f 13 While the use of the word "complaint" may be broadly interpreted to include counterclaims in 
some situations,(fn4) a statutory interpretation construing the language of section 38-1-1 l(4)(a) to 
include liens enforced by counterclaim is too expansive because such an interpretation runs counter to 
the purpose and context of the Mechanics' Lien Act, the plain language of section 38-1-1 l(4)(a), and the 
narrow scope of protection LRFA was intended to provide. 
f 14 Next, we must determine whether section 38-1-1 l(4)(a) applies regardless of the remedies 
available to the property owner under LRFA. LRFA protects homeowners from having to pay twice for 
the same improvements. Id. §§ 38-11-107, 38-1 l-204(3)(b) (2001). It does so by providing that once the 
homeowner has paid the general contractor in full, the homeowner and the home are then free from 
:laims and liens of subcontractors who also worked on the home. See, e.g., id. § 38-11-107(1) 
'providing owners relief only against parties with agreements "other than directly with the owner"); id. § 
58-1 l-204(3)(b) (providing owners relief only after the owner "has paid in full the original contractor"); 
d. § 38-11-102(14) (defining "original contractor" as "a person who contracts with the owner of real 
)roperty"). In such cases, LRFA instructions and the forms referenced in section 38-1-1 l(4)(a) allow the 
>wner of a residence to dispose of the case quickly and easily, without having to incur the expenses of 
itigation. 
f 15 Looking to the whole statutory framework of the Mechanics' Lien Act and the limited 
jrotections LRFA was intended to provide, we hold that where a lien claimant seeks to enforce a lien on 
i property owner with no rights available under LRFA, compliance with the notice requirements of 
ection 38-1-1 l(4)(a) is not required. However, a lien claimant who chooses not to comply with section 
8-1-1 l(4)(a) does so at her own peril and risks losing her cause of action if mistaken as to the 
pplicability of the requirements. 
|16 In this case, however, LRFA does not provide Sill with a remedy. Sill had not paid the original 
ontractor, Hart, in full. Thus, Sill had no right or protection available under LRFA. Had he been served 
rith the notices required by section 38-1-1 l(4)(a), they would have been useless to him as he had no 
available rights" to "exercise" under LRFA. Id. § 38-1- 1 l(4)(a)(i), (ii). Furthermore, as explained 
bove, once he initiated legal action, his need for protection against an unwarranted mechanics' lien 
ithout incurring the costs of litigation evaporated. Hart therefore was under no obligation to comply 
ith the notice requirements of section 38-1-1 l(4)(a). 
f l7 We note that if an owner has rights available to her under LRFA, the situation will be different, 
a lien claimant seeks to enforce a mechanics' lien on the owner of residential property even though the 
iprovement has been paid for in full, she may "be barred from maintaining or enforcing the lien upon 
e residence." Id. § 38-1-1 l(4)(e) (2001). If the notice requirements in fact apply, a contractor would be 
oviding the owner with an affirmative defense pursuant to section 38-1-1 l(4)(e). 
|^18 We agree with the court of appeals' conclusion in its review of this case, Sill v. Hart, 2005 UT 
pp 537, K 14, 128 P.3d 1215, and in Pearson v. Lamb, 2005 UT App 383, U 15, 121 P.3d 717, that 
ction 38-1-1 l(4)(e) does not act as a jurisdictional bar, but rather provides owners with an affirmative 
fense. Section 38-1-1 l(4)(e) (2001) provides that "[i]f a lien claimant fails to provide to the owner of 
s residence the instructions and form affidavit required by Subsection (4)(a), the lien claimant shall be 
rred from maintaining or enforcing the lien upon the residence." In Pearson, the court of appeals held 
it "failure to adhere to section 38-1-1 l(4)(a) [does] not divest the trial court of jurisdiction." 2005 UT 
)p 383, ^  15. Similarly, because failure to comply with section 38-1-1 l(4)(a) raised a defense '"outside 
or extrinsic to'" Hart's prima facie mechanics' lien claim, the court of appeals recognized that it was an 
affirmative defense. Sill, 2005 UT App 537, f 15 (quoting Prince v. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 
68,1j31,56P.3d524). 
f 19 In determining whether a statutory provision is jurisdictional, we begin with the presumption 
that "district courts retain their grant of constitutional jurisdiction in the absence of clearly expressed 
statutory intention to limit jurisdiction." Labelle v. McKay Dee Hosp. Ctr., 2004 UT 15, | 8, 89 P.3d 
113. The notice requirements of section 38-1-1 l(4)(a) are merely directory in nature rather than 
mandatory and jurisdictional. A "designation is mandatory . . . if it is 'of the essence of the thing to be 
done.'" Pearson, 2005 UT App 383, % 7 (quoting Beaver County v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 919 P.2d 
547, 552 (Utah 1996)). Hart's failure to include the instructions and forms "did not compromise the 
purpose of the [Mechanics' Lien] Act." Pearson, 2005 UT App 383, \ 8. Invalidating Hart's ability to be 
paid for his labor solely due to a procedural error that went unnoticed by Sill for more than two and a 
half years would "clearly contravene^ the intended purpose of the Mechanics' Lien Act." Id. ff 8, 14. 
Further, the notice requirements of section 38-1-1 l(4)(a) serve "a wholly informational role," are a 
"minor component" of the Mechanics' Lien Act, and are one of "numerous procedural hurdles to 
enforcing a lien." Id. [^f 11, 12 (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the notice requirements 
:oncern only "the proper, orderly and prompt conduct of the business" and are therefore directory and 
lot jurisdictional. Id. ^12 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
CONCLUSION 
|^20 In sum, we hold that section 38-1-1 l(4)(a) is not triggered when a lien claimant seeks to enforce 
t lien by filing a counterclaim rather than an initial complaint. Further, when a lien claimant seeks to 
enforce a lien upon a property owner with no rights available under LRFA, compliance with the notice 
equirements of section 38-1-1 l(4)(a) is not required; however, the lien claimant bears the risk of 
providing an owner with an affirmative defense by disregarding the notice requirements in cases where 
ley are applicable. We reverse the court of appeals and remand for further proceedings consistent with 
lis opinion. 
Tf21 Associate Chief Justice Wilkins, Justice Durrant, Justice Parrish, and Justice Nehring concur in 
hief Justice Durham's opinion. 
Dotnotes: 
1. At the time Hart filed the mechanics' lien, Utah Code section 38-1-1 l(4)(a) required a party 
eking to execute a lien against a residence to include with the service of the complaint upon the owner 
'the residence "instructions to the owner of the residence relating to the owner's rights under" the 
ssidence Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act (LRFA) and "a form affidavit and motion for 
mmary judgment to enable the owner of the residence to specify the grounds upon which the owner 
ay exercise available rights under" LRFA. Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-1 l(4)(a)(i), (ii) (2001) (amended 
ipp. 2006). 
The Mechanics' Lien Act, id §§ 38-1-1 to -29 (2001) (amended 2005 & Supp. 2006), "provide[s] 
Section to those who enhance the value of a property by supplying labor or materials," AAA Fencing 
K v. Raintree Dev. & Energy Co., 714 P.2d 289, 291 (Utah 1986); see also Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-3, 
die LRFA, id. §§ 38-11-101 to -302 (2001) (amended 2005 & Supp. 2006), provides a narrow 
tutory framework for the protection of residential property owners. Id. § 38-11-107. LRFA allows 
ners to avoid incurring costs associated with litigation due to unwarranted mechanics' liens. Id. 
2. Since 2001, section 38-1-11 of the Mechanics' Lien Act has been amended so that it no longer 
requires service of a summary judgment motion form. See Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-1 l(5)(a) (Supp. 
2006). 
3. Contrary to Sill's assertion, the court of appeals did not decide this question in American Rural 
Cellular, Inc. v. Systems Communication Corp., 939 P.2d 185 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). In that case, the 
court held that the word "action" included complaints as well as counterclaims. Id at 193. However, the 
particular portion of the Mechanics' Lien Act at issue in that case provided "'in any action brought to 
enforce any lien under this chapter . . . . ' " Id. (emphasis added)(quoting Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18 
[Supp. 1996)). It was not qualified in any manner, unlike the language at issue in the case before us 
today where "action" is qualified as a "complaint" served "on the owner of the residence." 
4. "A counterclaim is viewed as an original action, instituted by the defendant against the plaintiff 
ind is tested by the same tests and rules as a complaint." Harman v. Yeager, 134 P.2d 695, 696-97 (Utah 
1943) (concluding that an answer that did not set out a cause of action did not constitute a counterclaim). 
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